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Derivatives are a class of ﬁ  nancial instruments that derive their value from some underlying 
commodity, security, index, or other asset. Futures and options are common forms of 
derivatives. This article explains how clearing and settlement systems for exchange 
traded derivatives work.
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Because of its role in fostering a sound 
ﬁ  nancial system, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago has taken a keen inter-
est in clearing and settlement systems for 
derivatives products, in particular, the 
risk-management, banking, and payment 
systems that support such clearing and 
settlement systems. The Seventh Federal 
Reserve District is home to over half a 
dozen exchanges and four systemically 
signiﬁ  cant clearing organizations, or 
central counterparties (CCPs).1 As these 
markets have grown, their potential sys-
temic implications for the nation’s ﬁ  nan-
cial system have similarly increased. 
Previous Chicago Fed Letter articles have 
explained the concepts of clearing and 
settlement in general,2 and the settlement 
of foreign exchange contracts in par-
ticular.3 This Chicago Fed Letter expands 
upon the general clearing theme, discuss-
ing speciﬁ  cally how derivatives CCPs’ 
margining4 and settlement systems work 
and how they affect payment and set-
tlement systems and foster public con-
ﬁ  dence in organized markets and the 
ﬁ  nancial system in general.
Derivatives
Derivatives are ﬁ  nancial contracts that 
are traded on organized exchanges or in 
the over-the-counter (OTC) market—a 
decentralized market model where mar-
ket participants ﬁ  nd other market par-
ticipants to trade with. As is the case 
with derivatives in general, futures and 
options derive their value from the cur-
rent or expected market value of an un-
derlying commodity, security, index, or 
ﬁ  nancial instrument or from the occur-
rence or magnitude of an event. For 
example, a futures or options contract 
based upon the expected value of a for-
eign currency versus the dollar would be 
directly affected by changes in the “spot” 
(or current) foreign exchange rate be-
tween the two currencies, the prevailing 
and anticipated interest rates of both 
currencies, and other economic indica-
tors that capture economic growth or 
relevant international capital ﬂ  ows. 
Similarly, a futures or options contract 
based on a commodity like corn would 
be based on the amount of corn currently 
in storage; anticipated corn crop yields; 
and anticipated demand for corn, eth-
anol, and other corn byproducts.
Exchanges versus the OTC market
Exchanges provide a forum for attracting 
interested buyers and sellers. Trade in-
termediaries solicit clients and assume 
the ﬁ  nancial risk of those clients. Some 
OTC instruments, notably certain stan-
dardized interest rate swaps and credit 
default swaps,5 are eligible to be cleared 
by one or more CCPs, even though the 
contracts were bilaterally negotiated in 
the OTC market and not on an exchange. 
Unlike securities, where settlement occurs 
in three business days or fewer, deriva-
tives instruments are ﬁ  nancial contracts 
Derivatives are traded on 
organized exchanges or in 
the over-the-counter market— 
a decentralized market model 
where market participants 
ﬁ  nd other market participants 
to trade with.that are often outstanding for weeks and 
even years. Derivatives contracts are re-
valued daily and eventually mature or are 
liquidated. To address the continuing 
ﬁ  nancial risk throughout the life of 
derivatives contracts, all derivatives ex-
changes are associated with one or more 
CCPs that guarantee ﬁ  nancial perfor-
mance among all clearing members.6
Derivatives CCPs
A derivatives CCP guarantees the ﬁ  nan-
cial performance of its clearing members. 
At the time that a trade matches,7 the 
CCP becomes the buyer to the selling 
clearing member and the seller to the 
buying clearing member. In this way, 
clearing members do not need to make 
a credit assessment of the other clearing 
members or their clients. In an electronic 
trading environment, clearing provides 
valuable anonymity; buyer and seller (and 
buying clearing member and selling 
clearing member) rarely know (or need 
to know) each other’s identity.
In order to guarantee the performance 
of all clearing members, a derivatives CCP 
collateralizes, or “margins,” the ﬁ  nancial 
performance exposure that the CCP has 
to each of its clearing members. This is 
called performance bond collateral, and 
it is based upon the historical price vol-
atility8 of the instruments, multiplied 
by the number of open (unliquidated) 
positions that a clearing member has 
with a CCP.9 By setting the performance 
bond collateral requirements at levels 
that anticipate a likely one-day market 
(price) movement,10 a CCP should have 
any potential liquidation risks reasonably 
well collateralized before the fact.11
Should a clearing member fail to satisfy 
its ﬁ  nancial obligations to a CCP, that 
CCP would declare the clearing member 
to be in default and would transfer or 
liquidate its positions, liquidate the rel-
evant performance bond collateral, and 
apply the proceeds to cover the costs of 
liquidation.12 Should the costs of liqui-
dation exceed the proceeds of the per-
formance bond collateral, any residual 
loss would be covered by the very substan-
tial ﬁ  nancial assets held in reserve.13
Clearing members satisfy their perfor-
mance bond (initial margin) collateral 
requirements by depositing eligible assets 
(which are largely composed of cash, 
U.S. Treasury securities, and equity secu-
rities) with the CCP. Similarly, clearing 
members’ clients collateralize the risk 
of their positions with their respective 
clearing members by providing eligible 
performance bond collateral assets, most 
of which are simply passed through by 
the clearing members to the CCP. Per-
formance bond collateral requirements 
are generally set to cover one day’s prob-
able market movement with a 95% to 
99% conﬁ  dence limit. To protect itself 
from the probable liquidation costs asso-
ciated with a defaulting clearing member, 
the CCP must then “refresh” the utility 
value of the performance bond collateral 
daily. The CCP does this by removing 
each day’s market risk from the clearing 
system, thus preventing losses from accu-
mulating above the levels collateralized 
by the performance bond collateral. Re-
moving this market risk is accomplished 
by revaluing all open positions to current 
market prices (thus, they are “marked 
to market”). Clearing members having 
a debit balance with the CCP are required 
to promptly satisfy that deﬁ  ciency. The 
process for doing so for futures contracts 
is somewhat different than the process 
for options contracts.
Futures settlements
All futures contracts are revalued at least 
once per day. The change in value (up or 
down) of those contracts from the prior 
valuation price to the current valuation 
price is known as variation margin, or 
“settlement variation.”14 Since there are 
always an equal number of buyers and 
sellers for each futures contract, the CCP 
collects cash variation margin from clear-
ing members having an aggregate debit 
balance and pays those funds to clearing 
members having an aggregate credit bal-
ance. Clearing members receiving varia-
tion margin on behalf of their clients 
complete the process by crediting that vari-
ation margin to the individual accounts of 
clients whose futures contracts increased 
in value. It all balances to the penny.
Options settlements
Options settlements are asymmetric be-
cause the risks associated with purchasing 
or selling (writing) options contracts are 
asymmetric. First, the option buyer must 
pay (through his clearing member and 
the CCP) the option seller the purchase 
price of the option in cash (option pre-
mium pass-through). Once that is ac-
complished, the option buyer owns an 
asset (the option) that can change in 
value like any other asset, and the option 
seller posts performance bond collateral 
to support the seller’s ability to perform 
during the life of the option.15 There are 
no continuing margining processes that 
affect the option buyer. Since all of the 
continuing liability to perform lies with 
the option seller, the seller must properly 
collateralize the option contract from the 
moment it is sold, and the seller must 
post additional performance bond collat-
eral should the value of the option in-
crease in value over the original trade 
price. In this manner, both the clearing 
member representing the option seller 
and the CCP are holding performance 
bond collateral from the option seller in 
an amount that equals or exceeds the cur-
rent market value of the option. While 
the CCP makes the initial call for addi-
tional performance bond collateral in 
cash, clearing members quickly substi-
tute securities for that cash, typically on 
the same day. Thus, an options CCP al-
ways holds collateral equal to or greater 
than the market value of all options that 
it has issued (cleared).
Settlement banks
In order to be admitted to a CCP, clearing 
members must satisfy and maintain min-
imum ﬁ  nancial requirements and estab-
lish a settlement banking relationship with 
one or more settlement banks. Settlement 
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banks provide specialized commercial 
banking services to CCPs and to clear-
ing members of those CCPs. As part of 
every clearing cycle,16 CCPs transmit the 
settlement obligations of clearing mem-
bers to the clearing members’ settle-
ment banks. Settlement bankers make 
the determination to either honor or 
decline the CCPs’ demands for payment, 
knowing that to decline a demand for 
payment will almost certainly constitute 
a default under the rules of most clear-
ing organizations.
Assuming that the settlement bank is 
prepared to satisfy all of the settlement 
demands for all of its clearing member 
clients, it issues its binding commitment 
to do so, usually both in writing and ver-
bally on a recorded line of the CCP, al-
though the technology varies with the 
CCP. Some CCPs now have procedures 
that require their settlement banks not 
just to make a commitment to pay, but 
to actually remit the requisite funds to 
the account of the CCP by a predeter-
mined deadline.
One of the types of settlements that a CCP 
asks a settlement bank to process17 is a 
request for additional performance bond 
collateral for futures or options. Variation 
margin (the marked-to-market funds) 
for futures is collected at least daily from 
the bank accounts of clearing members 
having a debit balance with the CCP and 
remitted to the bank accounts of clear-
ing members having a credit balance.
Thus, on any given day, a settlement bank 
will likely have both debits and credits to 
process for its clearing member clients. 
Invariably, a CCP ends up with either too 
much or too little money in its accounts 
at its settlement banks. To balance its 
accounts, a CCP provides its settlement 
banks with instructions either to expect 
covering funds from one or more settle-
ment banks or to transfer excess funds to 
one or more settlement banks. Once these 
interbank balancing transfers have been 
completed, another clearing cycle is com-
plete, and that risk has been removed 
from the CCP’s clearing system. This has 
an important implication—a CCP can 
only remove market risk from its clear-
ing system when the national banking 
system is open.
Conclusion
Public conﬁ  dence in organized markets 
depends in large part upon the smooth 
functioning of the clearing and settlement 
systems that support those markets. This 
so-called ﬁ  nancial plumbing includes pay-
ment systems (including securities settle-
ment systems and securities depositories) 
used by clients to settle with their clearing 
members and by clearing members and 
CCPs that hold those securities and make 
and receive payments. The settlement 
process today is concentrated among 
fewer and fewer settlement banks.
Clearing and settlement systems work 
perfectly when all relevant settlement 
payments are made promptly. If clearing 
members are not given full or immediate 
access to funds due from a CCP, then, 
absent any information to the contrary, 
clearing members and other market par-
ticipants might assume that the CCP has 
failed to completely collect losses from 
other clearing members, resulting in a 
loss of public conﬁ  dence in the settlement 
process. Indeed, late settlement payments 
associated with derivatives markets were 
one of the root causes of near payments 
gridlock during the 1987 market crash.18
Clearing members and especially CCPs 
must also have the infrastructure and 
human capital to accurately process a 
record number of transactions and be 
prepared to handle a potential default 
every day that their markets are open. 
That is an extraordinarily high standard 
of preparedness, and it comes with a cost 
that cannot and should not be trivialized 
or compromised.
Many CCPs are still using outdated com-
munications technologies, such as faxes, 
telephones, and CCPs’ vintage proprietary 
communications networks. As more and 
more public attention is focused on our 
ﬁ  nancial markets and the clearing and 
settlement processes that support those 
markets, it might be in everyone’s best 
interest to reassess current uses of legacy 
technology that might pose potential 
weaknesses to our settlement systems.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury 
recently proposed that all standardized 
OTC derivatives contracts should be 
cleared by one or more CCPs. Bringing 
even more derivatives instruments into 
clearing and settlement systems will con-
centrate market and operational risk even 
more than today, making it all the more 
important that CCPs function ﬂ  awlessly.
Lastly, much attention has been given to 
potential regulatory reform proposals 
for the larger ﬁ  nancial services industry. 
The recent proposal by the Obama ad-
ministration contains elements that would 
have an effect on the supervisory “over-
sight of systemically important payment, 
clearing, and settlement systems.”19 The 
administration’s proposal would also give 
the Federal Reserve the “authority to pro-
vide systemically important payment, 
clearing, and settlement systems access 
to Reserve Bank accounts, ﬁ  nancial 
services, and the discount window.”20 
It will be important for us to study the 
implications of these reforms should 
they become law.
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